"Being in Being":Contesting the Ontopolitics of Indigeneity by Reid, Julian & Chandler, David
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Lapland
This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version usually
differs somewhat from the publisher’s final version, if the self-archived
version is the accepted author manuscript.
"Being in Being"
Reid, Julian; Chandler, David
Published in:
EUROPEAN LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS
DOI:
10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284
Published: 03.04.2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Reid, J., & Chandler, D. (2018). "Being in Being": Contesting the Ontopolitics of Indigeneity. EUROPEAN
LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS, 23(3), 251-268. https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284
Document License
CC BY-NC-ND
Download date: 11. May. 2020
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cele20
The European Legacy
Toward New Paradigms
ISSN: 1084-8770 (Print) 1470-1316 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cele20
‘Being in Being’: Contesting the Ontopolitics of
Indigeneity
David Chandler & Julian Reid
To cite this article: David Chandler & Julian Reid (2018) ‘Being in Being’: Contesting
the Ontopolitics of Indigeneity , The European Legacy, 23:3, 251-268, DOI:
10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 10 Jan 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 3220
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The european Legacy, 2018
VoL. 23, no. 3, 251–268
https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284
‘Being in Being’: Contesting the Ontopolitics of Indigeneity 
David Chandlera and Julian Reidb
aDepartment of politics and International relations, university of Westminster, 309 regent St, Marylebone, 
London W1B 2hW, uK; bFaculty of Social Science, university of Lapland, pL 122, 96101 rovaniemi, Finland
ABSTRACT
This article critiques the shift towards valorizing indigeneity in 
western thought and contemporary practice. This shift in approach 
to indigenous ways of knowing and being, historically derided under 
conditions of colonialism, is a reflection of the “ontological turn” in 
anthropology. Rather than seeing indigenous peoples as having an 
inferior or different understanding of the world to a modernist one, 
the ontological turn suggests that their importance lies in the fact 
that they constitute different worlds and “world” in a performatively 
different way. The radical promise this view holds is that a different 
world already exists in potentia, the access to which is a question 
of ontology—of being differently: ‘being in being’ rather than 
thinking, acting and world-making as if we were transcendent 
or “possessive” modern subjects. We argue that the ontopolitical 
arguments for the superiority of indigenous ways of being should 
not be seen as radical or emancipatory resistances to modernist or 
colonial epistemological and ontological legacies but rather as a new 
form of neoliberal governmentality, cynically manipulating critical, 
postcolonial and ecological sensibilities for its own ends. Thus, rather 
than “provincializing” dominant western hegemonic practices, such 
discourses of indigeneity extend them, instituting new forms of 
governing through calls for adaptation and resilience.
Introduction
Throughout the history of colonialism, competing representations of the indigenous have 
been deployed by the colonial powers to their own advantages and ends.1 Whereas his-
torically the indigenous were represented as belonging to a past temporality in ways that 
legitimized colonial rule, today their representation as primitive and of the past are less prev-
alent. Anthropologists are thus more likely today to berate the failure of their discipline to 
challenge the teleological narratives underpinning the West’s historical sense of superiority. 
The concurrent assumption that indigenous peoples should open themselves to the world 
is also increasingly challenged by the converse idea that the West has much to learn from 
them.2 Accordingly, it is the West that must open itself to the indigenous in ways that not 
only recognize their rights to life but also recognize the superior value of their ways of life.
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Indeed, not just in anthropology, but in political theory as well, the historical experi-
ences and abiding conditions of indigenous peoples have become pivotal to theorizations 
of political subjectivity that avow the superiority of indigenous ways of being.3 Much of this 
theoretical work is aimed explicitly at “decolonizing statist thinking.”4 This article examines 
this shift. How is the decolonization of western thought proceeding? What attributes of 
indigeneity do western theorists most admire? Is this decolonization actually occurring 
and how is it reflected in the policies of western states, institutions and social practices?
Modernist understandings of the world are in crisis today as reflected by the transfor-
mation in western approaches to indigeneity and in particular to “indigenous knowledge.” 
This crisis is being played out in the domain of ontopolitics—the debate over the politics 
of being. We claim that the current governing practices seek to celebrate indigenous ways 
of being not simply to promote the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples but to find 
new ways of governing the populations of the western world broadly conceived. We hold 
that the challenge of ontopolitical arguments for the superiority of indigenous ways of 
being should not be seen as radical or emancipatory resistances to modernist or colonial 
epistemological and ontological legacies but rather as a new form of neoliberal governmen-
tality, cynically manipulating critical, postcolonial and ecological sensibilities for its own 
ends. Rather than “provincializing” dominant western hegemonic practices, discourses of 
indigeneity are functioning to extend them, instituting new forms of governing through 
calls for adaptation and resilience. The basic issue, we argue, is not that of resisting western 
or modernist attempts to colonize or assimilate communities seen negatively as indigenous 
or nonmodern, but the opposite: that of preventing the indigenization of contemporary 
neoliberal governmentalities.
Ontopolitics of Indigeneity
We are not alone in seeing the transformation of approaches to indigeneity as a symptom of 
the crisis of the modernist episteme. We are happy to think with and through the work of 
Mario Blaser, among others, who has highlighted the connections between the ontopolitics 
of indigeneity and the reworking of discourses of western hegemony. Blaser argues that the 
modernist framing of knowledge hinged upon the interrelated and co-constitutive framing 
of three core elements.5 Firstly, the strict divide between nature and culture: the modern 
idea that there is only one universal reality, accessible through science, whereas diverse per-
spectives and views of this reality were articulated through studies of culture. Secondly, the 
understanding of cultural difference in hierarchical and temporal terms, whereby modern 
culture (based on the nature/culture divide) is understood to have developed from the west-
ern Enlightenment and to have spread through colonial and imperial expansion to the rest 
of the globe. And thirdly, the linear conception of time according to which the development 
and territorial expansion of modernity is seen as part of the process of historical progress, 
leaving “nonmodern” cultures as peoples without histories or historical subjectivity.
As Blaser notes, the coherence and hegemonic acceptance of these three elements has 
now started to unravel. This unraveling is expressed across the social sciences and humani-
ties as the “ontological turn,” which challenges the foundational and universal claims of the 
nature/culture divide.6 He points out that work in Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
has been key to problematizing the claims of the separation between nature and culture, 
which reflects the broader loss of faith in the powers of science and technology to sustain 
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modernist notions of progress. Blaser also notes the contribution of indigenous political 
movements in Latin America, especially in Bolivia and Ecuador, which have contested 
the liberal politics of multiculturalism and raised previously excluded questions about the 
nature and spaces of politics, challenging the modernist ontology that restricts rights and 
protections only to human subjects. This disruption of the division of authority between 
science and politics draws on Bruno Latour’s view of the gradual collapse of the Modern 
Constitution in matters of ecological, scientific, moral and environmental concerns and 
which is clearly not merely a product of the “Indigenous struggle” itself.7
It is necessary to clarify from the outset that, although it is possible to relate the political 
challenge of indigeneity to indigenous political movements, this challenge is far broader in 
content and stakes. As Blaser argues, the field of ontological politics is one fought out over 
“practices, performances and enactments and not with specific groups.” For our purposes 
we conceive indigeneity as a surface on which ontopolitics appears rather than as the driver 
or dynamic behind this critical challenge. The ontopolitical clash between a modernist 
ontology and alternative ways of “worlding” is not literally a clash between different groups 
or collectivities, as Blaser clarifies: 
In short, the attribution of modernness would go hand in hand with specific practices and 
not with a specific group. For instance, I would feel unwarranted to call modern the practices 
of middle-class white women involved in Wicca. Likewise, neither indigenous identity auto-
matically translates into an other-than-modern ontology, nor does indigenous involvement 
make a conflict an ontological one.8
Indigenous approaches and indigenous “knowledge” should not be seen as representative of 
a political, social or cultural group but rather as an alternative to modernist ways of being, 
knowing and governing. The rise of indigeneity and the transformation in approaches to 
indigeneity therefore says more about the crisis of modernist ways of being in the world 
than about the struggles and demands of indigenous groups per se and is often in direct 
conflict with them.9
What is important is that the ontological turn in the social sciences—a metonym for the 
end of the culture/nature divide—has gained new traction for celebrations of indigenous 
forms of knowledge, ways of being and world-views that provide support for alternative 
practices and ways of acting in the world. These alternative approaches have been eagerly 
taken up by governing institutions seeking new ways of reviving and maintaining neoliberal 
frameworks of rule, from the international level through state bodies to local authorities. 
The convergence of critical approaches in STS, postcolonial theory, queer theory and post- 
structuralist feminism with new and emerging governing agendas has given indigeneity a 
political purchase that would otherwise seem entirely unrelated to historical or contempo-
rary political trends. In the rest of this essay we develop a careful analysis of how indigeneity 
functions discursively, both in political theory and policy, to produce new forms of thinking 
concerning subjectivity. These new forms of subjectivity, we argue, contrary to the claims 
of their manufacturers, are disabling of people’s capacities for political action.
In the following section we trace the rise of the notion of dispossession as a mode of 
being in the world that, while supposedly definitive of indigenous subjectivity, can and 
ought to be universalized as a “property” of subjects of the wider western world and beyond. 
Further sections relate the focus upon indigeneity to the ontological turn and the crisis of 
modernist approaches in the humanities and social sciences, particularly in anthropology 
and geography. We highlight how these forms of indigenous subjectification operate in 
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relation to the capacities and performativities of resilience, the aim of which is to help west-
ern societies cope with the environmental crises of the Anthropocene. While the modern 
subject is encouraged to “become indigenous,” the attention to indigeneity, we argue, does 
not extend to the suffering and struggles of indigenous peoples who are held to have failed 
to become more-than-human exemplars of resilience.
Dispossession and Indigenous Agency
The appropriation and occupation of indigenous lands, the dispossession of indigenous 
peoples, including notably, but not exclusively, the Palestinians, has led not simply to argu-
ments for the return of those lands to their original owners but also to the articulation of 
the experience and condition of dispossession itself as a basis on which to theorize political 
subjectivity. In terms of the will to combat liberalism and liberal theories and practices of 
subjectivity this focus on the problem of dispossession is understandable. As is well docu-
mented, liberal arguments dating back to the seventeenth century concerning the nature and 
right to property, especially the conditions for the exercise of the right to claim ownership 
of land, were fundamental to the colonial project and “gigantic process of expropriation” 
to which indigenous peoples were subjected.10 Colonizers, in other words, would not have 
been able to justify their projects without the underlying theories of property that served 
to legitimate the acts of dispossession of indigenous peoples.
Of all the theories of property it was John Locke’s theory that has proved the most influ-
ential in legitimating the colonial dispossession of indigenous peoples. Locke’s central claim 
was that only those who till the soil of the land on which they live, and improve, cultivate 
and develop it, can claim the right to own it. The distinction between those who cultivate the 
land and those who merely live off it thus provided the rationale for dispossessing indigenous 
peoples of the right to their land.11 This distinction concerns not simply the relationship of 
a people to a particular land but its relationship to nature as such. Is the people in question 
one that has transcended nature and through its development of the soil become its master? 
Or is it a people that lives simply in subordination to nature, as other animals do, living off 
the land without improving it? These are the questions that underlie the Lockean theory 
of property that provided the basis not just for the dispossession of indigenous peoples of 
the lands on which they lived, thus denying their right to those lands, but also the racist 
reasoning that in turn legitimated the long history of violence against them. No wonder 
then that the supposedly postliberal theories of political subjectivity today involve serious 
reflection on the nature of dispossession itself.
This postliberal approach is explicitly and forcefully critiqued in Judith Butler and Athena 
Athanasiou’s 2013 Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. They conceive disposses-
sion both as an act, “as one way that subjects are radically de-instituted,” and as an attribute 
of the subject that offers a counter-movement to the forces of dispossession. Butler and 
Athanasiou contest the histories and continuing realities of dispossession by addressing the 
deeper terrains of its subject-formations. The problem they identify lies both in the right to 
dispossess and in its assumption at the heart of the liberal subject. This assumption, which 
is crucial to the distinction between colonizing and colonized subjects, was the notion that 
the colonizers had transcended nature. Butler and Athanasiou seek to avoid any avowal of a 
subject that “possesses itself and its object world, and whose relations with others are defined 
by possession and its instrumentalities” in the struggle against regimes that dispossess 
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indigenous peoples. “Prizing the forms of responsibility and resistance that emerge from a 
‘dispossessed’ subject,” they underline their awareness that “dispossession constitutes a form 
of suffering for those displaced and colonized.” Their gesture of solidarity with the peoples 
who have been historically dispossessed is accompanied by a normative gesture that signals 
the need for constraint on the part of the indigenous lest they seek recourse to the forms 
of possessive individualism that the authors otherwise identify with colonizers: “How to 
become dispossessed of the sovereign self and enter into forms of collectivity that oppose 
forms of dispossession that systematically jettison populations from modes of collective 
belonging and justice” is thus the question they raise.12
Likewise, it is the question of how to oppose forms of dispossession in ways that func-
tion doubly to produce dispossessed forms of subjectivity.13 Too many social and political 
struggles against dispossession are thought to recuperate the same logic of possession that 
accounted for the original dispossession from which the struggles in question emerged. As 
Libby Porter argues, “the social field of rights-based struggle becomes stuck in a mode that 
seeks parity only within the frame of liberal ‘possessive individualism’. Rights under this 
conception are a bundle of things that can be possessed, held, alienated and exchanged, and 
express the positionality of a possessing unitary subject.”14 The project of liberalism—not 
just dispossessing peoples of their lands for liberal development, but reconstituting those 
peoples as liberal—requires that they too partake in the logic of possession, becoming them-
selves possessive subjects, claiming rights to property and procedures consistent with their 
liberalization. This invitation, to become possessive, to partake in the logic of possession, 
and to emerge as fully-fledged liberal subjects, is one that has to be refused.
This invitation, however, as we have known at least since Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched 
of the Earth (1961), is not what it seems to be. One cannot transition from colonized sub-
ject to liberal subject without conceding to one’s subjugation to the colonial schema itself. 
The sustainability of colonial power depends on the capacity to transform the colonized 
population into subjects of imperial rule.15 Thus the liberation from colonial subjugation 
requires the colonial subject to wage war on that schema itself.16 Embracing the logic of 
possession cannot work, therefore, as a mode of resistance to liberal colonialism. It does 
not work to produce justice even in the most naive sense. In situations where people have 
been dispossessed of the lands on which they lived, or as is often the case nowadays, have 
been displaced from one place to another, the ability to come into possession of another 
plot of land or place simply cannot compensate for their loss: “There is no genuine space 
in compensation payment calculus to attend to the loss and grief of a neighbourhood 
abandoned, the bulldozing of a home, the erasing of memories or the shattering of lives,” 
as Porter argues.17
Of course, as Porter admits, this critique does not quite apply in the context of indige-
nous claims. It is, as she argues, “a different manifestation of a possessory calculus at work 
in the recognition politics around indigenous land rights, for clearly indigenous claims are 
intrinsically linked to particular spaces. The whole notion of indigenous property is that 
it is inalienable, and cannot be traded for another locale on the planet.”18 The struggles of 
indigenous peoples, in Australia for example, to re-possess their lands, by claiming indige-
nous title rights, is real and ongoing, and meeting with some success. The royalties paid to 
title-owning indigenous people by mining companies has led to a growing Aboriginal mid-
dle-class. It is true that success here is measured merely in terms of the socioeconomic bet-
terment of Aboriginals under market conditions, by their ability, in other words, to exploit 
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their possessions through trade with other market actors, particularly resource-seeking 
extractive industries. This poses a serious problem for anyone concerned with the deeper 
political problem of the entrenchment of liberalism and the underlying colonization of the 
indigenous implied by such socioeconomic success. It is for this very reason that opposition 
to dispossession requires a wholly different mode of engagement, something other than a 
mere assertion of the struggle for possession.
Butler and Athanasiou define this alternative form of politics as “performative.” 
Performativity describes the ways by which dispossessed subjects produce themselves as 
political subjects under the conditions of their dispossession without asserting themselves 
as self-possessed and possessive subjects. It is a politics that applies and can be found, they 
argue, among a remarkably wide variety of subject positions: indigenous peoples dispos-
sessed of their land, refugees and the stateless, the sans papiers, migrant labourers, as well 
as sexual minorities that are “dispossessed by regimes of gender and sexual normativity.” 
Regardless of the normative constraint against becoming possessive, these are groups the 
precarious conditions of which actually preclude the assertion of “the logic of possession.” 
The performative emerges, they argue, “precisely as the specific power of the precarious—
unauthorized by existing legal regimes, abandoned by the law itself—to demand the end 
to their precarity.”19
Butler and Athanasiou discuss concrete instances of performativity—the singing of the 
national anthem of the United States in Spanish by illegal immigrants in the streets of Los 
Angeles in 2006; the street demonstrations and self-immolations in Morocco and Tunisia 
in 2010 and 2011 respectively, which contributed to the Arab Spring; hunger strikes; the 
marches of women across the deserts of Northern Mexico in protest of the rapes occurring 
there; the performance art of Regina Jose Galindo. All of these are instances of peoples dis-
possessing themselves in order to dispossess coercive powers.20 Other instances discussed 
by scholars of performativity include naked blogging, such as the naked pictures posted 
by the Egyptian Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, which are said to have contributed not just to the 
Egyptian revolution of 2011, but to a reconfiguration of the body politic and a re-imagining 
of the theater of the political.21 The use of public nudity by the Femen movement and its 
mobilization against Islamic oppression, including the “international topless jihad day,” is 
also discussed in this framework.22 We may also refer to the poignant acts of self-disposses-
sion on the Mediterranean shores, of people giving their homes to refugees who have been 
dispossessed of their own homes by ongoing wars whether in Syria, Africa or elsewhere.
What all such instances have in common, Butler and Athanasiou argue, is that “rather 
than implying a transcendent euphoria of effective will or redemption,” their performance 
“pertains to the ordinary and extraordinary forces of endurance and survival.” It is not a 
politics aimed at constituting a subject that is possessive but one that (re-)produces the 
subject’s dispossession while seeking to displace the regimes of dispossession through “a 
labor of sensing, imagining, envisaging, and forging an alternative to the present.”23 It is 
an alternative grounded, avowedly, in the condition and subject of dispossession. Yet how, 
indeed, to dispossess the dispossessed of any desire to become the possessors is the deeply 
paradoxical task Butler and Athanasiou set themselves. In this sense, whatever the authors 
might discursively claim, their work is also an argument for dispossession in the negative 
sense they claim to oppose. It presupposes a politics that can only function through modes 
of dispossession performed upon people and not simply in opposition to it. It is a politics 
that constructs a particular kind of body—obdurate, persistent, insistent on its continuous 
and collective thereness, organized without hierarchy, enacting its message performatively 
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through the occupation of a public space and its self-display, individually as well as collec-
tively. It is not a body that can ever or will ever master the space it occupies.
The argument, of course, is that this way of performing political subjectivity is necessary 
as a turn away from and against the liberal tradition of thinking and practicing political 
subjectivity, based as it supposedly has been on the assumption of a body that masters, 
possesses, and improves the spaces it occupies. Instead we have to grasp the body as a thing 
that performs a poiesis in space, that is, a double movement involving both desubjugation 
and self-making. This understanding of the body, of “the subject” as such, derives from 
Butler’s interpretation of Michel Foucault’s theory of the subject formation. Poiesis, she 
argues, is central to the mode of existence of the subject, which must risk itself in making 
itself in order to desubjugate itself from particular regimes of truth. This is not a theory 
of the subject as transcendent or masterful or in possession of itself or others, but rather 
of a self or subject outside of subjugating modes of subjectivation. The subject is always, 
regardless of its capacities to make itself, orchestrated by power.24
In the work of Butler and of others we can see that the indigenous subject is undergoing 
a transformation. No longer seen as a subject that calls for political solidarity in a struggle 
against colonial or neoliberal domination in order to repossess the lands of which it has 
been robbed, the transformed indigenous subject performs a new understanding of politics 
and ontology: by being dispossessed this subject challenges hegemonic ways of asserting 
possession. Here, it is not resistance but defeat itself that is celebrated.25 Thus the indigenous 
subject is no longer conceptualized in terms of what it might become but in terms of what 
it has been turned into by the very regimes that have exploited it.
Being in Being
This shift in approach to indigenous forms of knowing and being reflects the ontological 
turn in anthropology. Rather than seeing indigenous ways of understanding the world as 
inferior or different from our modern understandings, this turn suggests their importance 
as constituting different worlds and performatively “worlding” the world in a different way. 
The radical promise is that a different world already exists in potentia and that moderns 
can choose to make it by learning to world in the ways indigenous peoples already do. In 
place of the politics of critique we have an ontopolitics of alternative ways of being in the 
world. Access to this alternative world is a question of ontology—of being differently—
being in being rather than thinking, acting and world-making as if we were transcendent 
or possessive subjects.
It is the ontopolitics of being that makes the difference here. This is where the ontolog-
ical turn in anthropology plays a crucial role, one which is closely aligned to that of STS, 
or to actor-network theory approaches, which similarly seek to undermine the modernist 
episteme founded upon the culture/nature divide.26 The much-cited debate in the 2010 
issue of Critique of Anthropology on whether “Ontology is Just Another Word for Culture” 
highlights what is at stake.27 The point of contestation for the anthropologists who argue 
that the ontological turn is distinct from the study of culture is their concern that focusing 
on cultural understanding never took alterity seriously enough. In other words, the study 
of different cultures affirmed the modernist world-view rather than challenging it; its basic 
assumption was that western knowledge needed to expand to understand why other cultures 
thought in the way they did rather than questioning its hegemonic concept of the universal 
nature of knowledge.28
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This assumption was based on the view that the world was single and uniform and 
that culture depended on the plural ways of representing the world.29 The nature/culture 
divide was thus affirmed rather than challenged through the study of culture or the focus 
on epistemological differences. Blaser argues that the side-effect of the culturalist approach 
was that by minimizing differences the modern ontology was naturalized in the process of 
‘Sameing’ rather than Othering, which is why the turn to ontology “radicalizes” postcolonial 
theory by taking difference more seriously.30
Martin Holbraad, in turn, argues that the ontological approach does not start from 
the question of why others “get stuff wrong” but rather challenges the analytical concepts 
anthropologists actually use.31 Thus the ontological turn is an ethical challenge to take alter-
ity seriously by taking what interlocutors say literally rather than metaphorically. However, 
for Blaser (drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, John Law, Donna Haraway, Annemarie 
Mol and others) this is where the ontological turn reaches its limit: it assumes that realities 
are “out there” rather than being continually and multiply enacted or performed.32 On 
this point Mol’s work is particularly useful: “understanding ontology as performance or 
enactment brings to the fore the notion of ontological multiplicity,” where different stories 
and practices are neither describing something existing ultimately ‘out there’ nor are they 
mistaken or metaphorical, but actually enact or ‘world’.33 This defines ontological work that 
tends to see multiple ontologies as a literal metaontology (such as Philippe Descola’s project 
of mapping ontologies, or Bruno Latour’s An Inquiry into Modes of Existence).34
The focus on enactment, performance and practice is crucial to understanding the cen-
trality of indigeneity and indigenous knowledge in the contemporary critical and policy 
discourse. Rather than taking as given the multiple ontologies of anthropology and thus 
reducing ontology to culture, ontologies should be practiced or enacted rather than merely 
mapped, studied or collected.35 It is these enactments that bring new worlds into being. But 
the question is what worlds should and should not be brought into being. All these worlds 
potentially exist equally at the ontological level: the distinction is an ethico-political one. 
Whereas postcolonial and decolonial thought seeks to bring other human, nonmodern 
worlds, into a relationship of equality and mutual respect, the debate around indigeneity 
and indigenous knowledge cannot be fully grasped in these traditional political terms. The 
political ethics of the ontological turn goes beyond the anthropocentric contestations of 
the last century by emphasizing the urgency of listening to nonhuman actors and agents. 
It is thus in the new context of global warming, extreme weather events, environmental 
disasters and the Anthropocene that indigeneity and alternative ways of being are integrated 
into governance.
The point we wish to emphasize is that in extending its scope to include the nonhuman, 
the focus on indigeneity is not merely a reflection of the crisis of modern ontology but is a 
necessary result of the particular form of that crisis today. In making this claim we do not 
mean that indigenous peoples are seen or treated as if they were nonhuman or not fully 
human, but quite the opposite: we seek to promote and extend indigenous ways of being. 
However, the reason why indigenous ways of being are feted is for the specific attributes of 
coping with natural or environmental problems, which are seen to evade the grasp of mod-
ern science and technology. When nature was seen as a passive object open to modernist 
understanding and appropriation, indigenous ways of being were said to lack history and 
agency. Today, the tables have turned. As Latour notes, it seems that nature has more power 
and agency than humans and better ways of knowing and calculating.36 The collapse of the 
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nature/culture divide and the focus on the interactive and contingent power and agency of 
natural forces, previously ignored and thought to be passive, innate and lacking in agency, 
has transformed the understanding of indigeneity. The indigenous are the anthropocene-
alogists of nonmodern ontology: they can teach us how to see the nonhuman differently.
Indigenous Knowledge
Indigenous ways of being and knowing are not re-evaluated today because of a newfound 
concern with indigenous peoples or out of solidarity with their struggles. Indigenous knowl-
edge is not valued or constructed for its own sake; the point is to preserve this knowledge as 
a different ontology in a world of multiple ontologies. It is used metonymically for ways of 
developing new empirical and pragmatic approaches for dealing with environmental crises 
under the constraints of neoliberal ideology. The byword for the interest in indigeneity and 
indigenous knowledge is resilience: the need to accept and cope with environmental disasters 
and the consequences of global warming.37 In the face of recurring economic recessions 
and lack of mobilizing political ideologies, governing elites seek to draw on critical and 
postcolonial thought to sell the end of the liberal imaginaries of progress and development 
as an emancipatory vision of learning to adapt to natural contingencies.
Indigenous knowledge is a practical, performative, nonmodern ontology. What is at stake 
is the capacity of indigenous ways of knowing to take alterity—the nonhuman—seriously 
rather than the anthropologists’ capacity to take indigeneity seriously. If the latter were the 
case, the focus would not be on the problems of the modern episteme but on the problems 
facing real indigenous groups in their struggles over rights, representation and resources.38
There are two key aspects in promoting indigenous knowledge. Firstly, the pragmatic 
ways of coping with ongoing crises, that is, discovering coping strategies and learning to live 
in permanent crises. Laura Rival, for example, has studied how the manioc cultivators of 
Guyana “have learnt to live with” severe drought and flooding as normal conditions of life.39 
It is these kind of coping strategies that have brought indigenous knowledge to the forefront 
of international policy gatherings, as exemplified in the work of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Indigenous knowledge was acknowledged in the Fourth 
Assessment Report as “an invaluable basis for developing adaptation and natural resource 
management strategies in response to environmental and other forms of change.”40 This 
recognition was reaffirmed at IPCC’s 32d Session,41 and traditional knowledge was included 
as a guiding principle for the Cancun Adaptation Framework adopted at the 2010 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference in Cancun (UNFCCC).42 
The outline of the IPCC’s Working Group II contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report 
included local and traditional knowledge as a distinct topic within Chapter 12 on human 
security.43 As a joint UNESCO and UN report states:
Indigenous [peoples] are not only potential victims of global climate change. Attentiveness to 
environmental variability, shifts and trends is an integral part of their ways of life. Community-
based and local knowledge may offer valuable insights into environmental change due to climate 
change, and complement broader-scale scientific research with local precision and nuance. 
Indigenous societies have elaborated coping strategies to deal with unstable environments, and 
in some cases, are already actively adapting to early climate change impacts. While the transfor-
mations due to climate change are expected to be unprecedented, indigenous knowledge and 
coping strategies provide a crucial foundation for community-based adaptation measures.44
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Secondly, the actual ways of knowing—the preventive or anticipatory knowledge of 
nonhuman forces, which is occluded by modernist ontology. In the Anthropocene, the 
main concern is not to bring in excluded human voices and political alternatives but rather 
to quell political debate and human demands by listening to the alleged needs of “nature” 
and the “environment.” The entry of “things” or the “nonhuman” into political discourse 
cannot come about without the claims to knowledge of their interlocutors. While things 
cannot speak for themselves, indigenous forms of performativity enable hearing their voices, 
and act as intermediaries. Thus indigenous ways of being can extend the ontopolitical 
ethics to include the realm of the more-than-human. Whereas anthropology, even after 
the ontological turn, can only focus on human understandings and make things speak 
through humans,45 indigenous knowledge, so it is claimed, provides the one route through 
the subject/object quagmire.
Laura Rival provides two examples of how indigenous ways of knowing enact a nonmod-
ern epistemology and ontology through taking alterity seriously. On the epistemological 
level, rather than focusing on representational knowledge, indigenous knowledge works 
relationally: it sees things in relation to each other rather than focusing on causal chains. It 
can thus build on the knowledge of nonhuman actants in the environment such as plants 
and animals:
to anticipate subtle changes in the weather by observing the flowering and fruiting of certain 
plant species, the feeding and nesting behavior of certain bird species, or changes in the behav-
ior of amphibious animals—in particular alligators. … There is little doubt that the Makushi 
use a complex system of ecological indicators to predict changes in weather patterns.46
On the ontological level, Rival draws attention to alterity, which appears to lie beyond 
the reach of radical anthropologists who cannot abandon their modernist assumptions. The 
concern with seeing from the point of view of nonhuman actants and agents presupposes 
a close communal relationship with the more-than-human being. As an example, Rival 
describes a project to reintroduce Coho salmon to a polluted watershed on the Amazon, 
which failed when undertaken by Western experts with modern science and technology 
but was a success when guided by indigenous knowledge: “This was accomplished through 
observing the river, to know it and experience it as a salmon would,” by not seeing the river 
as a straight line but as a series of vortexes and branching fractals.47
This attention to alterity stands in direct opposition to theories of subjectification as an 
autonomous actor or subject of rights; here there is the imaginary of acting in the world 
without modernist culture/nature or subject/object divides. As the Aboriginal activist Mary 
Graham writes: “Western logic rests on the division between the self and the not-self, the 
external and the internal… [whereas] Aboriginal logic maintains that there is no division 
between the observing mind and anything else: there is no ‘external world’ to inhabit.”48 Julie 
K. Gibson Graham and Gerda Roelvink invoke the ontopolitical ethics of indigeneity as an 
example of embodied nonmodern knowledge and the construction of more-than-human 
communities. In their 2010 article in the radical journal Antipode, they cite the Aboriginal 
anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose:
Rather than humans deciding autonomously to act in the world, humans are called into action 
by the world. The result is that country, or nature, far from being an object to be acted upon, 
is a self-organising system that brings people and other living things into being, into action, 
into sentience itself.49
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Drawing upon indigenous, feminist and STS approaches, they argue that rather than the 
modernist perception of human subjects acting upon the world, we need to let the world 
affect us by developing the indigenous capacities of “learning to be affected.” Allowing the 
land to speak to us would enable the development of more-than-human communities that 
are necessary for life in the Anthropocene.50
Becoming Indigenous
The dominant current discourse of neoliberal governance centers on resilience, of “learning 
how to learn in living environments.” As Rival argues, this is a demand to “become indig-
enous.” She coins the term “indigenous intelligence” to denote the capacity to learn how 
to dwell in the world in such a way that one is intertwined and concerned with its care, 
such that one’s very care for the world functions as self-care. It is a form of intelligence that 
she documents not only in indigenous peoples, such as the Makushi in the borderlands of 
northern Brazil and southern Guyana, but also among the young environmental activists 
she met in Brazil who are learning how to dwell, to be in being, and are thus “becoming 
indigenous.” “Living well” for these activists “means thinking and acting in a world where 
built environments are not severed from wilderness, as all spaces need to be meshed within 
a web of relationships that unfolds into seamless socio-ecological spaces of dwelling.” For 
them “there is absolutely no difference between ‘caring for the earth,’ ‘caring for people,’ and 
‘caring for the self.’ It’s all part of the same ethics, all part of the same challenge.” Indigenous 
intelligence, the attribute that underwrites indigenous subjectivity, thus exists from the 
savannahs of the Guiana shield to the coasts of California.
Resilience, according to Rival, results from the capacity, the indigenous intelligence, of 
dwelling in the world:
[It] comes from understanding human physical presence on earth in terms of relative inten-
sity. At one end of the continuum, we find the houses and buildings where people live, work, 
and make intensive use of resources; at the other, the spaces where people refrain from going 
or intervening, and where nature is left alone to organize things. All aspects of human life 
are linked. First, food, water, and shelter, including the flows of energy and waste that make 
a home a home; then, transport, education, and models of decision making, or the web of 
relations that link homes together over time and space; finally, spirit or soul, or what links 
home dwellers to other sentient beings. This is how people and nature are linked up, in a total 
socio-ecological fact.51
The ascription of resilience to indigenous peoples has often been emphasized in recent 
years. The indigenous are seen and celebrated as paragons of a way of living in relation with 
nature—and as a model to peoples worldwide. Thus, according to Marjo Lindroth and Heidi 
Sinevaara-Niskanen, “The victims of the colonial past” are now perceived as “the agents of 
today’s world.”52 Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen offer a rare critique of this representation 
as a manifestation of how biopower preserves colonial power rather than “decolonize[ing] 
statist thought”—which anthropologists, such as Rival, claim should have happened. Yet 
the ascription of resilience to the indigenous is not argued only by radical anthropologists: 
it is a mantra so often repeated by states and other powerful actors worldwide that it has 
become a governing cliché.
It is, however, a powerful and dangerous cliché, for it presents the indigenous as an 
exemplary neoliberal subject who is defined, as we have argued elsewhere, by the capacity to 
262   D. CHANDLER AND J. REID
adapt to the dangers of the world in living a life reduced to the celebration of mere survival.53 
This cliché is powerful and dangerous insofar as it functions to discipline the indigenous 
themselves into performing their own resilience. But what happens to indigenous peoples, 
individually and collectively, when for whatever reason, they don’t show resilience? Are 
they somehow to be deemed less indigenous? Or are they examples of failed indigeneity? 
Are they less intelligent than other indigenous peoples?
In April 2016, while writing this article, the Guardian reported that the Attawapiskat peo-
ple, an indigenous community numbering around 2,000 members, living in the Canadian 
province of Ontario, had declared a state of emergency after 11 of its members attempted 
suicide. Reports indicated that 28 people had attempted suicide during the previous month, 
and that more than 100 had done so since the previous September (“State of Emergency 
Declared over Suicide Epidemic in Canadian First Nation Community,” Guardian, April 10, 
2016). The regional First Nations government responded by sending a crisis response unit 
including mental health nurses and social workers. On April 12, the Canadian parliament 
held an emergency debate on the crisis. Charlie Angus, the MP responsible for representing 
the Attawapiskat, was reported to have compared the crisis to that sparked by the photograph 
of Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian refugee, whose corpse was washed ashore on his 
way to Europe (Jorge Barrera, “During Suicide Debate Justice Minister Says It’s Time for 
First Nations to Shed Indian Act ‘Shackles,’” APTN National News, April 13, 2016). Angus 
described how the spate of suicides of the Attawapiskat had similarly “shocked the world” 
causing people worldwide to question how Canada could have neglected so many of its 
own population (“Canadian Parliament to Hold Emergency Debate on First Nation Suicide 
Crisis,” Guardian, April 12, 2016.) Jody Wilson-Raybould, the Justice Minister in Justin 
Trudeau’s government, and herself of indigenous origin, as reported by Barrera, declared 
that Canada’s indigenous peoples were now at a crucial juncture, “as they seek to deconstruct 
their colonial legacy and rebuild their communities,” arguing that “only the colonized can 
decolonize themselves and change is not easy.”
In March the larger Pimicikamak community of Manitoba, of around 6,000 members, 
was also declared to be in a state of emergency following a series of 6 suicides over three 
months, and 140 attempts in two weeks: “It’s sad that we had to do that,” said the chief of 
the Pimicikamak, but “we needed to tell the world that as Aboriginal people we don’t have 
a lot of those things that are available to others.” (Ashifa Kassam, “First Nations Suicide 
Emergency: A Symptom of Canada’s Systemic Neglect,” Guardian, April 13, 2016). That cry 
for help had not been met with the same response. There was no global news reportage of the 
declaration, no articles in the Guardian, and no world news television reports. The Canadian 
parliament held no emergency debate on Pimicikamak. The reasons for this disparity in 
response are as always impossible to be sure about. On the face of things it would seem an 
odd disparity. Six members of Pimicikamak had died as the result of their suicide attempts, 
while only one member of Attawapiskat had died. Why, then, did the Attawapiskat crisis 
draw such attention while that in Pimicikamak was ignored? Perhaps it was the density of 
attempts at suicide in Attawapiskat: 99 of those 100 enumerated attempts at suicide did not 
“succeed.” And yet those “failures” achieved a performative value that succeeded in eliciting 
a significant response from the world media, as well as from the Canadian government. In 
other words, we need to recognize suicide as another example of what Butler and Athanasiou 
describe as performative power: the possession of the dispossessed, that power that belongs 
to the precarious—unauthorized by existing legal regimes, abandoned by the law itself—to 
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demand the end to their precarity.54 “I will never apologise for declaring a state of emergency 
for our people,” said the chief of the Pimicikamak; “We want the mental health services, the 
therapists, the child psychologists, the psychiatrists, we don’t have these in the community” 
(Kassam, “First Nations Suicide Emergency”).
There is a certain irony in indigenous peoples’ demanding an end to their colonization 
by the state and at the same time demanding mental health services, therapists, child psy-
chologists, and psychiatrists. Desirous of independence and freedom from the state, they 
continue to express their dependence on the very same institutions that account for the 
conditions of their servitude. The dependence is real; it is not a fiction or simply a discourse. 
Indigenous men in Canada are far more likely to die by suicide than non-indigenous men; 
and indigenous women even far more likely than non-indigenous women. Young indigenous 
people, in particular, die by suicide five to six times more often than non-indigenous youth. 
And there is the widespread social suicide caused by diabetes, smoking, drinking, and obe-
sity—problems the inability to solve of which the indigenous themselves deplore. This is a 
people that is the polar opposite of the image of the resilient subject with which neoliberal 
regimes like to portray indigenous peoples: dependent, incapable of surviving without state 
intervention, and lost in the contradictions of its own discourses of self.
In her 2014 article, “In Attawapiskat,” published in the Walrus (October 15, 2014), Louise 
Bernice Halfe, the celebrated indigenous poet, described life in the very place where the 
suicide crisis is unfolding today. She describes the poverty and the desperation of the place 
and its people. She describes the ways in which the Canadian government, in alliance with 
the extractive industries, and the churches, “terrorized the people into submission, into 
accepting poverty.” How they “robbed a people, by diminishing the lives that had previously 
sustained them” and how that people now “sit precariously, alternating between self-preser-
vation and self-destruction, clinging to what can still be lost—still be taken”; these people 
“don’t complain loudly” but “live in the country of the heart,” the heart being “the only 
place to which they can escape.” On Attawapiskat “we struggle, but we manage, and even 
maintain a culture of ceremony and celebration. Life goes on. Black humour prevails as we 
poke fun at ourselves, and at the powers that be. Still… the spark of resilience endures and 
our people survive.”
Conclusion
We have argued that the figure of the indigenous, far from producing a decolonization of 
state thinking, is being deployed to valorize disempowering conceptions of subjectivity. 
Dispossessed, and disallowed the possibility to assert its counter-power to repossess, dis-
courses on indigeneity produce the image of a subject that perseveres through adapting 
itself to the natural exigencies of its existence. This is a subject whose life lacks the force 
“to act in the sense of making anything like a definitive event occur in the world,”55 but 
that nevertheless persists through its embodied and performative capacities for resilience: 
enduring and coping under extreme duress. Under traditional colonial and modernist dis-
courses, this view of indigenous peoples as resilient, this timeless or circular situation of 
stasis, would have been starkly counterposed to western or Eurocentric notions of progress 
or development.56 As such, it would have been an invitation to intervene, to colonize, develop 
or civilize. Today, in contrast, the ability to merely survive is seen as a lesson in resilience 
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and ecological sustainability that western subjects need to take on board in their attempts 
to survive in the new conditions of the Anthropocene.
Our aim in writing this article was to explore what it would mean to resist the call 
to “become indigenous” and suborn ourselves to the “more-than-human” communities 
espoused by radical academics and activists, drawing on feminist, poststructuralist and 
STS approaches, and promoted by leading international institutions that appear to want 
us to resign to a world of perpetual crisis. The proponents of the ontopolitics of “being 
in being” reify the contingent crises of neoliberalism as natural or inevitable. Thus the 
ontopolitical ethics of the Anthropocene parasitically feed off the crisis of the human and 
social sciences, built on the fragile grounds of the long dead modernist subject of Lockean 
possessive individualism. The upshot of this shift is that we should either construct a new 
vision of the human subject—one that is capable of resisting and creating a world fit for 
humanity—or consign ourselves to new forms of neoliberal dependency, based on the myth 
of indigenous resilience.
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Úrsula Oswald Spring, and Coleen H. Vogel. “Human Security.” In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group 
II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 755–91. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Berry, David, and Alexander Galloway. “A Network is a Network is a Network: Reflections on the 
Computational and the Societies of Control.” Theory, Culture & Society 33, no. 4 (2016): 151–72.
Blaser, Mario. “Ontological Conflicts and the Stories of Peoples in Spite of Europe: Toward a 
Conversation on Political Ontology.” Current Anthropology 54, no. 5 (2013): 547–68.
Blaser, Mario. “Ontology and Indigeneity: On the Political Ontology of Heterogeneous Assemblages.” 
Cultural Geographies 21, no. 1 (2014): 49–58.
Bohensky, Erin L., and Yiheyis Maru. “Indigenous Knowledge, Science, and Resilience: What Have 
We Learned from a Decade of International Literature on ‘Integration’?” Ecology and Society 16, 
no. 4 (2011): 6.
Butler, Judith. “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue.” In The Political, edited by David 
Ingram, 212–26. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
Butler, Judith, and Athena Athanasiou. Dispossession: The Performance in the Political. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013.
Carrithers, Michael, Matei Candea, Karen Sykes, Martin Holbraad, and Soumhya Venkatesan. 
“Ontology Is Just Another Word for Culture: Motion tabled at the 2008 Meeting of the Group for 
Debates in Anthropological Theory, University of Manchester.” Critique of Anthropology 30, no. 
2 (2010): 152–200.
Chandler, David. Resilience: The Governance of Complexity. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2014.
Chandler, David, and Julian Reid. The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability. 
London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Coulthard, Glen. “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Canada.” 
Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2007): 437–60.
Crawhall, Nigel. Indigenous Knowledge in Adaptation: Conflict Prevention and Resilience-Building. 
Conflict-Sensitive Adaptation: Use Human Rights to Build Social and Environmental Resilience. 
Brief 10. Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee and IUCN Commission on 
Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, 2014. http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/tecs_
csa_10_indigenous_knowledge_in_adaptation_crawhall.pdf. 
Descola, Philippe. Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Eileraas, Karina. “Sex(t)ing Revolution, Femen-izing the Public Square: Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, Nude 
Protest, and Transnational Feminist Body Politics.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 40, no. 1 
(2014): 40–52.
Escobar, Arturo. “The ‘Ontological Turn’ in Social Theory: A Commentary on ‘Human Geography 
without Scale’.” Transactions 32, no. 1 (2007): 106–11.
Gibson Graham, Julie K., and Gerda Roelvink. “An Economic Ethics for the Anthropocene.” Antipode 
41, no. s1 (2010): 320–46.
Goldstein, Alyosha. “Finance and Foreclosure in the Colonial Present.” Radical History Review 118 
(2014): 42–63.
THE EUROPEAN LEGACY  267
Graham, Mary. “Some Thoughts about the Philosophical Underpinnings of Aboriginal Worldviews.” 
Australian Humanities Review 45 (2008): http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/
Issue-November-2008/graham.html.
Hiwasaki, Lisa, Emmanuel Luna, Syamsidik, and Rajib Shaw. Local & Indigenous Knowledge for 
Community Resilience: Hydro-Meteorological Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change 
Adaptation in Coastal and Small Island Communities. Jakarta: UNESCO, 2014.
Holbraad, Martin. “Can the Thing Speak?”, Working Papers Series 7. Open Anthropology Cooperative 
Press, 2011. http://openanthcoop.net/press/http:/openanthcoop.net/press/wp-content/
uploads/2011/01/Holbraad-Can-the-Thing-Speak2.pdf. 
IPCC. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC, 2007.
IPCC. Review of the IPCC Processes and Procedures. Report by the InterAcademy Council (IPCC–
XXXII/Doc. 7), 32d Session, Busan, Seoul, October 11–14, 2010. IPCC, 2010.
Latour, Bruno. An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013.
Latour, Bruno. Facing Gaia: Six Lectures on the Political Theology of Nature. The Gifford Lectures on 
Natural Religion, Edinburgh, February 18–28, 2013 (draft version 1–3–13). 
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Lea, Tess. “Contemporary Anthropologies of Indigenous Australia.” Annual Review of Anthropology 
41 (2012): 187–202.
Lederman, Schmuel. “Making the Desert Bloom: Hannah Arendt and Zionist Discourse.” The 
European Legacy 21, no. 4 (2016): 393–407.
Lindroth, Marjo, and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. “The Biopolitics of Resilient Indigeneity and the 
Radical Gamble of Resistance.” Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 4, no. 2 
(2016): 130–45.
Losurdo, Domenico. Liberalism: A Counter-History. London: Verso Press, 2016.
Macpherson, Crawford B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962.
Mawani, Renisa. “Specters of Indigeneity in British-Indian Migration, 1914.” Law & Society Review 
46, no. 2 (2012): 369–403.
Mol, Annemarie. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002.
Nakashima, Douglas, Kirsty Galloway McLean, Hans Thulstrup, Ameyali Castillo, and Jennifer Rubis. 
Weathering Uncertainty: Traditional Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and Adaptation. 
Paris: UNESCO, 2012.
Palecek, Martin, and Mark Risjord. “Relativism and the Ontological Turn within Anthropology.” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43, no. 1 (2013): 3–23.
Porter, Libby. “Possessory Politics and the Conceit of Procedure: Exposing the Cost of Rights under 
Conditions of Dispossession.” Planning Theory 13, no. 4 (2014): 387–406.
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
Raygorodetsky, Gleb. “Why Traditional Knowledge Holds the Key to Climate Change.” United Nations 
University, December 13, 2011. http://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-traditional-knowledge-
holds-the-key-to-climate-change.html.
Reestorff, Camilla. “Mediatised Affective Activism: The Activist Imaginary and the Topless Body 
in the Femen Movement.” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media 
Technologies 20, no. 4 (2014): 1–18.
Reid, Julian. Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of 
Logistical Societies. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
Reid, Julian. “The Disastrous and Politically Debased Subject of Resilience.” Development Dialogue 
58 (2012): 67–79.
Reid, Julian. “Interrogating the Sustainable Development-Resilience Nexus Biopolitically.” 
International Political Sociology 7, no. 4 (2013): 353–67.
268   D. CHANDLER AND J. REID
Rival, Laura. “The Resilience of Indigenous Intelligence.” In The Question of Resilience: Social Responses 
to Climate Change, edited by K. Hastrup, 293–313. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of 
Sciences and Letters, 2009.
Sabaratnam, Meera. “Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace.” Security Dialogue 
44, no. 3 (2013): 259–78.
Sissons, Jeff. First Peoples: Indigenous Cultures and their Futures. London: Reaktion Books, 2005.
UNFCCC. Report of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the 
Parties on its 16th session, Cancun, Mexico, 29 November–10 December 2010. Bonn: UNFCCC, 2010.
